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Abstract
In this paper we present a calibrated life-cycle model which is able to simul-
taneously match asset allocations and stock market participation proles over the
life-cycle. The inclusion of per period xed costs and a public pension scheme erad-
icates the need to assume heterogeneity in preferences, or implausible parameter
values, in order to explain observed patterns. We nd a per period xed cost of less
than two percent of the permanent component of annual labour income can explain
the limited stock market participation. More generous public pensions are seen to
crowd out private savings and signicantly reduce the estimates of these xed costs.
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rst time that concurrent matching of participation and shares has been
achieved within the standard preference framework.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a life-cycle portfolio choice model, with realistically calibrated sto-
chastic labour income and reasonable risk aversion, explaining some of the stylised facts of
household asset allocations. Empirical studies consistently nd that approximately fty
percent of US households do not invest in the stock market (whether directly or indirectly),
and those that do participate hold only a small proportion of their wealth in risky assets.
Despite recent developments in nancial markets, which have lead to greater levels of par-
ticipation and higher shares of risky assets in household portfolios, the empirical evidence
still presents a signicant challenge to the life-cycle model. This paper demonstrates that
the addition of a per period xed cost to stock market participation, and public pension
provision, enables us to explain the observed limited participation and substantial portfolio
diversication.
A wide literature presents models of intertemporal choice incorporating precautionary
and retirement motives for saving; many of the empirical patterns of wealth accumulation
and consumption have been accounted for within this framework (Hubbard, Skinner and
Zeldes, 1995; Carroll, 1997; Attanasio et al., 1999; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). More
recently, a literature has emerged which allows for the simultaneous determination of con-
sumption and portfolio allocation within a life-cycle framework. However, it has proved
di¢ cult to explain asset allocations without assuming unrealistic wealth accumulation,
extreme parameter values or heterogeneity in preferences. Cocco, Gomes and Maen-
hout (2005) present a thorough analysis of the standard household portfolio choice model
without any xed cost considerations. They are able to force portfolio shares down to rea-
sonable levels, in addition to obtaining signicant age e¤ects. However, this is achieved by
accepting unrealistically high levels of saving1. Further, their model predicts one hundred
percent participation at all ages, a result which is clearly in conict with reality.
1A combination of using a very high coe¢ cient of risk aversion ( = 10) and assuming a small probability
of a zero income event, which triggers the precautionary response too much.
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The literature has come to accept that some form of information cost is required to
move away from the complete participation prediction of the standard model. This is
corroborated by the empirical work of Paiella (2001) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), both
of whom have shown that xed costs to stock market participation can empirically ratio-
nalise the observed limited participation. These xed costs can be one-o¤ entry costs or
per period costs; however, the estimates of these costs are very low2. There has been
signicant progress with incorporating one-o¤xed costs of stock market entry into house-
hold portfolio choice models; Alan (2006) calibrates the level of this entry cost to match
moments from the PSID, producing a value of two percent of annual labour income. With
this one-o¤ xed cost, Alan is able to match the participation rate very precisely. As a
bu¤er stock saving model, Alans framework cannot attempt to match the wealth data;
the resulting low levels of saving means that her model cannot address the issue of port-
folio diversication3. Gomes and Michaelides (2003) set an exogenous xed entry cost of
two and a half percent of annual income and are able to attain reasonable age proles of
both participation and shares. However, they only achieve this by assuming preference
heterogeneity, Epstein Zin utility functions, and very high levels of savings.
Hitherto, it appears that the life-cycle model is restricted to matching one key statistic
at a time (wealth, participation or shares) within the standard preference framework.
This paper illustrates how this inopportune prediction can be overcome by assuming two
relatively simple extensions: per period xed costs to stock market participation and public
pension provision. Firstly, while entry costs are a convincing way to lower participation
early in life, they cannot be the causal factor behind low levels of participation for older
households. Our innovation of considering per period xed costs enables us to account
for low participation at both early and late stages of the life-cycle. Furthermore, per
period xed costs ensure that stock market participants endogenously hold greater levels
2Paiella (2001) nds a per period xed costs of US$ 95-175, while Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) nds that
transaction costs of US$ 260 can explain the behaviour of 75% of nonparticipants.
3Alans model predicts complete specialisation in stocks for all participants.
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of savings; therefore, they are more able to diversify away from full specialisation in risky
assets. In addition to the afore mentioned empirical signicance, per period xed costs are
also intuitively appealing: it is clear that information plays an important role in investment
decisions, and these decisions must be made at each and every period over the life-cycle.
Gathering and processing such information is costly: these costs may be the material
cost of paying for the assistance of a nancial advisor, or time costs of collecting and
managing the data. These information requirements directly a¤ect the cost of saving,
by determining access to and utilisation of di¤erent investment technologies, and this has
important implications of households ability to accumulate wealth and diversify their
portfolios.
Secondly, the retirement motive for saving is of great importance for wealth accumula-
tion, especially when considering investment in stocks, and tends to be ignored or treated
rather imprecisely in the literature. Previous work tends to either completely disregard
participation and portfolio share decisions during retirement4 or impose exogenous retire-
ment pension income, with little consideration of the e¤ect of collecting the tax revenues
required to fund such schemes. Taxation has a direct e¤ect on the cost of saving and this
has important implications for optimal participation rates and portfolio shares. In this pa-
per we introduce a stylised pay-as-you-go public pension scheme, funded by a proportional
tax on labour income. We demonstrate the e¤ect of changing public pension generosity
on optimal portfolio allocations and on the size of the xed cost necessary to explain the
observed participation.
This paper simulates a household model of portfolio choice and calibrates the model to
match moments from the US data. By means of these two innovations, we advance the
literature by demonstrating how the life-cycle framework is now able to account for at least
two statistics concurrently, without resorting to heterogeneity in preferences or implausible
parameter values, and can match all three moments if we are willing to accept relatively
4As in Alan (2006).
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high risk aversion and discount rates. This paper is the rst study to simultaneously
match participation, shares and asset holdings with the data; we are able to achieve this
with a per period xed cost of less than two per cent of the permanent component of labour
income and a proportional tax rate of twenty percent.
In the next section we provide some data on asset holdings, participation and portfolio
shares by households in the US. Section 3 develops our household model of portfolio
choice. Section 4 provides simulated life-cycle proles of asset accumulation, stock market
participation rates and risky asset shares; showing the e¤ect of introducing per period
xed costs, varying the public pension provision, and changing the level of risk aversion.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data on asset allocations
This section details some stylised facts on asset accumulation and allocation which are
addressed by our life-cycle model. Asset accumulation proles are well documented,
where mean asset holdings are seen to rise sharply when households are in their 30s and
40s and then diminish gradually during retirement5. Low (2005) shows that the mean
asset holdings peak around retirement, at a magnitude of around seven times greater than
mean income. Low calculates that the US median asset to income ratio across working
life is 1.846, and it is to this statistic that we calibrate our simulated asset holdings.
When addressing household investment allocations it is important to distinguish be-
tween two distinct decisions; participation and portfolio shares. First, participation repre-
sents the binary choice of whether to participate in the stock market or not. Stock market
participation in the US is currently just above fty percent, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer
(2002) report that 56.9% of households hold risky assets7. There is a clear age e¤ect on
5Although this decline is not always present in median asset holdings, see Burnheim (1987).
6He uses the 1995 PSID wealth supplement, dening wealth to include housing wealth and using PSID
weights.
7Using 1998 SCF weighted data. Risky assets are dened as including: directly held stock; stock
held through mutual funds, retirement accounts, trusts and other managed assets; corporate, foreign and
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participation and a hump shape in the decision of whether or not to hold risky assets has
been much discussed (Alan, 2005; Ameriks and Zeldes, 2001; Poterba and Samwick, 1999;
Gomes and Michaelides, 2005). The top panel in Figure 1 uses data from the US Survey
of Consumer Finances to show how stock market participation follows such a hump shape,
with limited participation at early and late stage of life. Participation is also increasing
in wealth, with richer households much more likely to hold risky assets than poorer house-
holds. Using multivariate probit techniques Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) nd that
both age and wealth e¤ects are signicant for the participation decision in the US.
The second important statistic is the portfolio share; this represents the share of risky
assets to total assets, conditional on participating in the stock market. These portfo-
lio shares are typically well below 100% (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2001; Bertaut and Starr-
McCluer, 2002; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; and others). Bertaut and Starr-McCluer
(2002) nd that the average portfolio share in the US is 54.4%8. Gomes and Michaelides
(2005) nd a similar results, with an average share of 54.8%. The bottom panel of Figure 1
demonstrates that the age e¤ect on portfolio shares is fairly weak. In reality, it is common
practice for nancial advisors to tell their clients to shift their portfolios away from risky
assets as they age, especially as they enter retirement9. This is evident in Figure 1(b),
where portfolio shares fall from just over 60% for households aged 55-64 to around 55%
for the retired. However, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) nd that these age e¤ects are
not robust to more sophisticated econometric analysis.
The model in this paper is calibrated to match these average statistics and it aspires
to explain both the limited participation and strong portfolio diversication.
mortgage-backed bonds; business equity; and investment real estate.
8Using 1998 SCF weighted data. Dening risky assets as before.
9So called "life-cycle" funds do this automatically for investors.
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3 Life-cycle model
Individuals are assumed to maximise the sum of expected discounted lifetime utility in
light of uncertain and uninsurable labour income and rate of return risk. Utility is dened
over a single nondurable consumption good, and is additively separable across time but
non-separable within period. Let there be T periods in the life-cycle of which a given K
periods are spent in retirement and T   K give the working life. This standard set-up
gives the following constrained maximisation problem:
max
!s;Cs
Et
"
TX
s=t
s tu(Cs)
#
(1)
subject to,
As+1 = (As + Ys   Cs   I(:)F )[!s(1 + reqs ) + (1  !s)(1 + r)] (2)
and a terminal condition, AT+1 = 0. In each period  is the discount factor; Ct is
consumption; At is the amount of assets held at the start of period t; Yt is exogenous real
disposable labour income net of taxes; F is the absolute per period xed costs of stock
market participation; !t is the portfolio share; r and r
eq
t are the risk free and risky returns
respectively; and I(:) is an indicator function taking a value of unity when the individual
participates in the stock market, and zero otherwise.
In each period t the agent has to decide how much to consume and how much to
save out of cash-on-hand, which is comprised of assets held at the start of the period and
realised income (At + Yt). Any savings, given by (At + Yt   Ct), are invested and earn a
composite portfolio return denoted by the terms in square brackets in equation (2) above.
We assume the portfolio investment is comprised of two distinct saving tools, a riskless
and a risky asset. The riskless asset has a constant real return of r and the risky asset
has a stochastic real return of reqt , which is assumed to be i.i.d. over time and distributed
lognormally. We do not impose any correlation between stocks and labour income as the
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empirical evidence on the size and magnitude is mixed. Heaton and Lucas (2000) nd
insignicant estimates for all but the highest educational group, and Davis and Willen
(2001) surprisingly nd negative correlations for low educational groups. Further, the
e¤ect of such a correlation has been shown to make very little di¤erence to participation
and portfolio shares in practice (Gomes and Michaelides, 2005), unless unrealistically high
correlation coe¢ cients are chosen.
The portfolio share, !t, represents the proportion of assets held in risky forms. In order
to invest in risky assets in any given period the individual has to pay a xed cost of F .
These per period xed costs can be thought of as representing brokerage or membership
fees. Alternatively, the F represents time costs of information gathering and corresponds
to the opportunity costs of acquiring data on nancial markets, monitoring brokers, keeping
up to date with trends etc.. Let us dene a parameter f representing this absolute xed
cost, F , as a proportion of permanent income. This follows from the motivation of the xed
cost being an opportunity cost of time; also, such a specication signicantly simplies the
solution to the model as it removes the necessity to have an additional state variable.
Some limited borrowing is allowed, up to the discounted sum of the minimum income
individuals will receive in each remaining period, with no borrowing permitted against
pension income. A short sales constraint is imposed on equity such that the portfolio
shares must always lie between zero and one (inclusive). Therefore, agents can only borrow
at the risk free rate and can only invest in risky assets if they hold positive balances10.
During working life, labour income is uncertain and non-diversiable. Following the
standard specication in the literature,11 we shall assume that the stochastic labour income
process can be broken down into a deterministic component, which can be calibrated to
match the hump shape of income over the life-cycle; and two stochastic components, a
permanent and a transitory shock:
10While it is true that we do see households simultaneously borrowing and holding stocks in the data,
this restriction is imposed on the model for simplication.
11See MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), Mo¤tt and Gottschalk (2002) for examples of papers
modelling the properties of individual earnings.
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Yt+1 = (1  )Gt+1Pt+1t+1 (3)
where t is transitory income, Pt is permanent income,  is a proportional pension-tax (set
exogenously) and Gt is a deterministic growth trend. The log of permanent income is
assumed to follow a random walk.
Pt+1 = Pt"t+1 (4)
Both transitory and permanent shocks are assumed to be independently and identically
distributed lognormally such that ln(t)  N( 0:52; 2) and ln("t)  N( 0:52"; 2").
The income process is truncated such that a zero level of income cannot be realised, oth-
erwise individuals would optimally choose never to borrow.
For the nal K periods of life individuals are retired, during which time they receive a
constant and certain pension income,  . We construct a pay-as-you-go pension scheme,
somewhat akin to the arrangements in the US, with pension payments being funded out
of contemporaneous tax revenues. At any particular point in time, we assume that there
exists an equal mass of individuals at each age; with working population share being T K
T
,
and the fraction of households in retirement given by K
T
. Let tax revenue collected from
individual i at age a be given by ia = Y
i
a :

(1 ) . Summing pension contributions over all
individuals, H, and all working ages, T  K, and normalising by the number of retirees,
H:K, gives the following constant annual pension income for each retired household:
  =
T KX
a=22
HP
i=1
ia
H:K
This set-up gives us a system with three state variables (At; Yt; Pt) and two control vari-
ables (Ct; !t). The rst order condition of the value function with respect to consumption
is given by:
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u
0
(Ct) = Et
n
[!t(1 + r
eq
t ) + (1  !t)(1 + r)]u
0
(Ct+1)
o
(5)
and the rst order condition with respect to portfolio share is given by:
0 = Et
h
(r   reqt )u
0
(Ct+1)
i
(6)
These two conditions can be solved for the following policy functions in each period:
Ct(At; Yt; Pt) (7)
!t(At; Yt; Pt) (8)
These two optimal decision rules are solved recursively from the nal period for a
discrete number of points in the state space. The details of the solution method are given
in Appendix A.
4 Simulation results
Once the optimal policy functions have been determined, we can simulate the model to
imitate the behaviour of a population of households and report average allocations to show
the e¤ect of introducing xed costs and changing the public pension scheme. Initially, we
shall detail the functional forms, parameter values and calibration statistics used. Sub-
sequently, we shall show the results of simulating the model for 10,000 ex-ante identical
households who di¤er in the realisation of shocks.
We then put forward the results in four subsections: rst, we analyse e¤ect of intro-
ducing per period xed costs to our baseline life-cycle model and show this modication
changes the participation results substantially. Second, we show the e¤ects of altering the
generosity of the public pension scheme. Third, we increase asset holdings and demonstrate
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how our model is able to match both participation and shares. Finally, we demonstrate
how we are able to match participation, share and asset holdings. This structure permits
us to disentangle the di¤erent e¤ects of varying xed costs, public insurance and asset
holdings in order to better t the data.
Parameters and Calibration The utility function is assumed to take the typical
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form
u(Ct) =
C1 t
1   : (9)
with a baseline value of 2 for the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. This is in line with estimates
based on consumption data: Gourinchas and Parker (2002) nd estimates of risk aversion
ranging from 0.28 to 2.29 and Alan and Browning (2003) nd ranges from 1.99 to 4.79.
The riskless rate of return is set at a constant value of 1.6%, which represents the
average annualised real rate of US 3-month treasury bills from 1960-2000. The risky
return is drawn from a distribution with a mean of 5.6%, corresponding to a 4% equity
premium12, and a standard deviation of 0.213. The deterministic trend in the income
process is taken directly from Low (2005) with the parameter values emerging from a
regression of log wages on a quadratic in age, controlling for demographics and cohort
e¤ects. This gives the well documented concave income prole over the life-cycle, where
income rises from the start of working life to a peak around an age of 50, and then declines
to retirement. The values for the variance of permanent and transitory shocks to income
are taken from Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). These parameter values are shown in Table
I.
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE]
A baseline tax rate of 20% is chosen giving a retirement replacement ratio of 0.57 of
12As is common in this literature; see Gomes and Michaelides (2005), Haliassos and Michaelides (2002),
Yao and Zhang (2005), Cocco (2001), Campbell et al. (2001)
13See Alan (2005). Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Haliassos and Michaelides (2002) use a similar
value of 0.18
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last working period permanent annual labour income. In reality the pension tax system
in the US is more complicated than the set-up assumed here, but this proportionate rate
is chosen as a reasonable proxy. The implied replacement ratio is in line with those used
in the literature, for example, Low (2005) used a replacement rate of 0.55.
The values for the xed cost, discount rate and (in the nal two scenarios) risk aversion
are chosen by calibration. The value of the xed cost is chosen in order to match simulated
mean participation with the observed mean in the data (0.57). We choose the discount
rate such that simulated ratios of median asset holdings to income match the PSID for
the working households (1.84)14. In addition, in the nal two scenarios, we choose the
risk aversion parameter to match the mean portfolio share statistic of 0.54. Calibration
parameters and statistics are shown in Table II.
[INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE]
4.1 Introducing per period xed costs
4.1.1 Baseline case without xed costs
In our baseline parameterisation we set the per period xed costs to zero and calibrate the
model to match the PSID median asset holding to income ratio (1.84). The dashed-line
graphs in Figure 2 show the cross-sectional mean proles of asset holdings, stock market
participation and conditional portfolio shares.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Under these baseline parameters the discount rate necessary to match the level of assets
is 8.6%. This is signicantly higher than the discount rate Low (2005) obtains using
a similar set-up without endogenising the return to savings15 but well within the range
estimated by Alan and Browning (2003)16. This relatively high impatience is required to
keep asset accumulation at the required level, since saving is now much more desirable and
14Except for the scenarios where we explicitly x the discount rate.
15He nds a discount rate of 3% is able to match the US data.
16They nd discount rates ranging from 5.3% to 11.6%, depending on the level of education.
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the higher average returns make assets accumulate at a faster rate. The dashed line in
the top panel of Figure 2, agents are seen to accumulate assets up until retirement, and
then run their balances down during the last 15 years of non-working life, reaching levels
that are in the same order as those seen in the data. Average assets are always positive,
but some individuals do borrow, up to the endogenous borrowing limit, in the early stages
of life.
The dashed line in Figure 2(b) shows participation in the stock market is 100% for
all but a few years in early and late life; only those individuals with negative savings
do not participate. This is in conict with the data, clearly illustrating the famous
`portfolio participation puzzle, discussed at length in the nance literature. Moreover,
in this model framework, without any transactions costs, there is no explicit participation
decision; nonparticipants are simply those agents in debt who are constrained not to hold
risky assets by the bounds on !t.
Figure 2(c) details portfolio shares conditional on participation in the stock market.
The mean portfolio share of stock market participants is 0.98 which is well above the true
value of 0.54. In contrast to the complete market models there is a modest age e¤ect in
the portfolio share prole. However, the shares remain very high; they equal unity for
the initial stages of life and are subsequently seen to fall slightly. This depicts what has
been termed the portfolio specialisation puzzle, whereby only wealthy agents, which in
our model are the older agents, are able to diversify away from complete specialisation
in risky assets. Households with low levels of savings invest all their assets in the risky
investment tool, as their consumption path is driven mainly by the stochastic income
process rather than the return to savings. As households build up larger savings balances,
their consumption paths are determined more by the return to the risky investment; once
a certain threshold of wealth is reached, it is no longer optimal for households to hold all of
their assets in the risky saving tool (see policy functions in Appendix B). In this baseline
model, it takes thirty years of asset accumulation for individuals to be able to hold both
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risky and riskless assets in their portfolio.
The baseline model exemplies the inability of the standard framework to explain
household portfolio choice, neither participation nor shares are close to being matched.
Some progress has been made at explaining portfolio shares (see for example Gomes and
Michaelides, 2005) by allowing unrealistically high levels of asset holding. Reconciling
shares with high levels of saving means that participation is necessarily unrealistically
high, given few households will choose to borrow. This demonstrates the inopportune
trade o¤ between participation and shares that is inherent in these household models as
they stand. We shall argue that the introduction of per period xed costs provides a
signicant contribution to helping us resolve these much discussed problems.
4.1.2 Including calibrated per period xed costs
Introducing per period xed costs, and calibrating the model to match the asset to income
ratio of 1.84, leads to a slightly lower discount rate (from 8.6% to 8.2%)17. Introducing
the xed cost, increases the cost of saving; and so the discount rate must fall to keep the
level of savings constant. In addition, the per period xed costs are calibrated to match
the average participation rate of 0.57, giving a per period xed cost of 5.0% of permanent
annual labour income. These results are detailed in the solid lines in Figure 2; we can see
that the increased cost of saving depresses asset accumulation early in life; this reduced
precautionary saving is compensated by more retirement saving in mid-life, in order to
keep the median level calibrated to the PSID.
The introduction of per period xed costs has a marked e¤ect on the stock market par-
ticipation prole, with a clear hump shape now evident in Figure 2(b). Few individuals
accumulate su¢ cient wealth in the rst ten years of working life to make it viable to pay
the xed costs of participation, and they hold only riskless assets in their portfolio. As
individuals age they accumulate assets, risky investments become protable and participa-
17The results from keeping the discount rate the same and only calibrating the xed cost are not
signicantly di¤erent.
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tion increases; peaking at age 57 with 97% participation. As assets are drawn down later
in life, the number of individuals participating is seen to fall gradually back to very low
levels. Figure 2(c) shows that the inclusion of xed costs generates a more pronounced age
prole in the conditional portfolio shares, with shares declining into retirement as expected.
However, the model continues to predict complete specialisation in risky assets early in life
and a mean portfolio share of 0.9718, which is considerably higher than observed in the
data.
A per period xed cost of 5% of the permanent component of labour income is able
to explain the observed limited participation, zero portfolio shares of small savers and
conditional shares declining with age. However, predicted shares remain high and the
calibrated value of the per period xed cost is considerably higher than those reported in
the data studies of Paiella (2001) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), the next subsection o¤ers
a potential explanation for these low empirical estimates.
4.2 Changing the generosity of the public pension scheme
In this section we analyse the e¤ect of changing the public pension generosity in a model
where xed costs are calibrated to match the US average participation in the stock market.
Varying the tax rate changes the e¤ective impatience through altering the income prole;
lowering the tax leads to less pronounced income growth and lower e¤ective impatience.
This gives us the choice of either allowing this lower e¤ective impatience to manifest in the
form of higher savings or increasing the discount rate in order to keep savings at the same
level as before the tax change. Thus, we consider two di¤erent scenarios; rst, we shall
analyse the e¤ect of varying the tax rate while keeping the level of asset holdings constant,
and allowing the discount rate to change in order to achieve this. Second, we consider
keeping the discount rate constant, and allow savings to vary. We shall reduce the tax
rate, and by so doing decrease the generosity of the state pension, in order to determine
18This is marginally smaller than the mean share predicted by the model without xed costs, as savings
behaviour has altered little.
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the e¤ect on the calibrated level of xed costs and on the proles of asset accumulation,
participation and portfolio shares.
4.2.1 Keeping savings constant
In this scenario we calibrate the model separately under each tax rate to match two em-
pirical statistics, asset holdings and participation. This explores the e¤ect of changing the
generosity of the pension scheme assuming that average savings and participation remain
the same. The discount rate is calibrated to match median asset holdings (1.84) and the
per period xed cost is calibrated to match mean participation of 0.57. The results of
these simulations are shown in Figure 3.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Reducing the tax rate from 20% to zero, leads to the discount rate increasing from
8.3% to 9.9%. Changing the tax rate directly a¤ects the growth rate of income and,
hence, the e¤ective patience of the individuals. The lower the tax rate, the less steep is
income growth over an individuals life, and the more patient they become. In order to
keep the median asset to income ratio consistent with the US data, the calibrated discount
rate must rise as we reduce the tax. If we had kept the discount rate the same across the
scenarios, assets would be higher under lower tax rates due to a lower e¤ective impatience.
Ensuring that asset holdings remain the same, leads to a redistribution of savings from
earlier years in the working life to mid-age; representing a shift from precautionary savings
to retirement savings, which is evident in the top panel in Figure 3.
In order to explain the observed limited average participation, the (calibrated) per
period xed cost increases from 5.0% to 6.4% of permanent annual income, as the tax rate
is brought down from 20% to zero. The tax change has a modest e¤ect on the participation
prole; because of lower precautionary balances, fewer individuals participate during the
early years of working life when taxes are low, as can be seen in Figure 3. Individuals
hold ever more retirement savings, increasing the peak level of assets and the mid-age
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participation rate. This large mid-age participation necessitates lower participation during
later life, in order to keep participation at the required level.
Figure 3(c) shows how lowering the level of public insurance leads to more diversied
portfolios. Mean shares fall from 0.97 to 0.82 (as shown in Table II), as higher asset
levels during mid-life push households onto the non-linear portions of their portfolio share
policy functions (see Appendix B). As taxes are reduced, the age e¤ects become more
pronounced; reaching the complete markets outcome at retirement, in the case when taxes
are zero and there is no pension income19.
It can be seen that lowering the generosity of the public pensions improves the t of our
model in terms of portfolio shares (for both mean levels and life-cycle proles); although,
they remain considerably greater than the observed shares. However, more generous public
pensions moderate the calibrated discount rate and per period xed costs, enabling asset
holdings and participation to be matched at more reasonable parameter values.
4.2.2 Keeping the discount rate constant
In this scenario we hold the discount rate constant, at the level calibrated in Section 4.1.2,
while varying the tax rate. This scenario examines the e¤ect of allowing average savings
to increase in response to lower taxes. As before, we calibrate the per period xed costs to
match average participation. We nd that reducing the generosity of the public pensions
scheme has a signicant e¤ect on the level of xed costs; increasing from 5.0% (when the
tax rate is 0.2), to 7.3% (when the tax rate is 0.1), to 8.5% (when the tax rate is zero).
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In Figure 4(a) the crowding out e¤ect of public pensions is clearly evident. Reduced
public pension provision is compensated for by greater private retirement savings; leading to
a welfare loss being associated with public pension provision20. The increased saving over
19The seminal work by Samuelson (1969) analysed portfolio choice in a complete markets situation with
no background risk. He showed that the portfolio share should be independent of wealth and age and be
given by ! = 2 , giving a value of 0.5 using our parameter values.
20This loss stems from the higher average returns to self-insurance.
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the life-cycle which less generous pension provision creates, allows earlier initial entry and
higher participation during mid-life. Again, smaller tax rates lead to more diversication
of assets; however, shares remain unrealistically high at early stages of life, and mean shares
are substantially above their true value (see Table II).
These few scenarios show that xed costs are negatively related to the generosity of the
public insurance mechanism. When taxes are high, the per period xed costs required to
match participation rates are substantially less than when taxes are low, or nonexistent.
With a fairly well developed public pension set-up, individuals are well catered for in
retirement and so have less incentive to save; given low retirement saving only a small
xed cost is required to explain the observed limited participation in the stock market.
However, in the situation where there is no public provision for old age, individuals hold
large amounts of assets in mid-life and are highly motivated to invest in risky investment
tools; high xed costs are then required to keep participation at the observed level. Our
ndings demonstrate that it is not surprising to nd empirical estimates of these xed costs
remain very low, given the well developed social security system prevalent in the US (see
Paiella, 2001, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002).
In all parameterisation of the model we are able to obtain realistic hump shapes in
the participation decision, if slightly more pronounced than the data. However, portfolio
shares remain considerable; mean values are too high and the prediction of 100% risky
holdings for young participants is unconvincing. This is a common problem with house-
hold models of portfolio choice, a trade-o¤ between matching participation and shares
seems inevitable. The problem stems from the nature of power utility and the ensuing
portfolio share policy functions; which dictate that large diversication can only take place
if savings are substantial, but with high savings households are highly motivated to partic-
ipate. Models with no xed cost considerations, or with one-o¤ entry costs, cannot aspire
to restrain participation when savings are high under a standard preference framework.
However, the innovation of this paper to include xed costs for each period of participa-
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tion, enables us to overcome this predicament and simultaneously match participation and
shares; it is to this we turn to next.
4.3 Matching participation and shares
It is not possible to match shares, under a standard preference framework, using the ex-
ogenous parameter values detailed in Table II. The reason for this stems from the lower
bound on shares implied by the Samuelson rule21. Under these parameters the lowest
possible portfolio share, realised as savings go to innity, is 0.5; with shares at reasonable
levels of savings being substantially higher. Therefore, attaining an average share of just
over a half is virtually impossible, suggesting di¤erent parameter values are required. The
Samuelson rule is determined solely by three parameters; the coe¢ cient of risk aversion,
the variance of the risky return, and the equity premium. Given that the variance and
return of risky assets are more precisely estimated, the most reasonable approach is to vary
the risk aversion parameter.
If we desist from matching asset holdings, our model framework allows us to calibrate
the coe¢ cient of risk aversion to match the mean portfolio share observed in the data;
giving a calibrated value of =4. This is somewhat higher than empirical estimates
generally attained from analysing consumption data, but remains well within the bounds
considered reasonable by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Alan and Browning (2003); it is
also in line with estimates attained from matching wealth data22. Furthermore, a value
of 4 is lower than parameters commonly used in the literature23.
In this scenario we x the discount rate to the value calibrated in Section 4.1.2 and
determine xed costs by calibrating simulated participation averages with the data; pro-
ducing a per period xed cost of 6.5%. The simulated proles are shown in the dashed
line in Figure 5, with the prole under low risk aversion left in for comparison (represented
21See footnote 19.
22For example, Cagetti (2003) estimates a risk aversion parameter of 4.26 and Gakidis (1998) of 3.
23Gomes and Michaelides (2005) use a CRRA of 5 and Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) use 10.
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by the solid line in Figure 5).
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
This model parameterisation demonstrates that we are able to match both mean partic-
ipation and mean asset allocation decisions, while still using reasonable parameter values
and a standard preference framework. Figure 5(b) shows the age prole for participation
displaying the expected hump shape; in addition, the hump is less pronounced than under
low risk aversion, bringing it more in line with the data seen in Figure 1. Further, the
portfolio share prole in Figure 5(b) is more realistic, with values well below unity for most
of life and declining with age.
The simple adaptation of the standard model to include per period xed costs has
resolved the long standing dilemma of simultaneously matching shares and participation.
In addition to keeping participation low at early and late stages of life, per period xed
costs ensure that stock market participants hold higher asset balances, enabling them
to diversify away from full specialisation in stocks. However, this is only achieved by
allowing households to accumulate greater amounts of wealth than they do in reality; with
these parameters the median assets are more than ve times greater than median income,
whereas in reality they are less than double (see second column in Table II). In the next
subsection, we show how the exibility of our model specication enables simultaneous
matching of participation, shares and asset holdings.
4.4 Matching participation, shares and wealth
In this scenario we demonstrate our models ability to match all three of the key asset
statistics; participation, shares and asset holdings. We calibrate the discount rate to
match median asset holdings, risk aversion to match mean portfolio shares and per period
xed costs to match mean participation; the results are detailed in the dotted lines in
Figure 5.
The age prole for asset accumulation now entails larger precautionary savings and less
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asset holdings for retirement compared to the scenario with low risk aversion, but remains
comparable to the cross section mean seen in the PSID. The participation prole is hump
shaped and much less pronounced than the case with a risk aversion of 2. The shares
are also reasonable; shares fall as households age and, in contrast to the low risk aversion
parameterisation, are less than unity for all ages. The portfolio share prole displays a
slight hump close to retirement, which is interestingly also evident in the data (see Figure
1). This derives from the steepness of the policy functions at this level of risk aversion;
with steep policy functions, the e¤ect of running down assets (which pushes portfolio shares
up) outweighs the age e¤ect (which shifts the policy functions in and pushes shares down)
over some range of ages - see Appendix B.
The calibrated xed costs now fall to 1.7% of the permanent component of labour in-
come, which is close to the empirical ndings discussed earlier. The calibrated coe¢ cient
of risk aversion is 6.4. This is signicantly higher than the value commonly used in the
consumption literature; however, it is perfectly in line with Woodford and Rotembergs
(1998) estimate of 6.25 and well below the upper bound of 10 instructed by Mehra and
Prescott (1985)24. In order to counter this risk aversion, and the entailing high precau-
tionary motive, an uncomfortably large discount rate of 49% is required to match asset
holdings. Even the high tax rate of 20% cannot moderate impatience at these parameter
values.
To date, the literature has only been able to match one of these statistics at a time,
under power utility and homogeneous preference; for example, Alan (2006) matches par-
ticipation and Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) match shares, but neither match asset
holdings. In the previous subsection we demonstrated the ability of our model to match
participation and shares simultaneously, under realistic parameters. Here, we match all
three statistics, with reasonable age proles, without the need to resort to heterogeneous
preferences or non-power utility functions. However, we achieve this at the cost of high
24Which is used by Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005).
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calibrated risk aversion and discount rate parameters.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyse household consumption and saving decisions in the presence of
two distinct saving tools and public pension insurance. We are able to match the life-cycle
averages of savings and asset allocations, while keeping to a fairly simple framework with
realistic parameter values.
We nd that a standard portfolio choice life-cycle model, calibrated to match the level
of savings in the PSID, gives extreme rates of stock market participation and very high
portfolio shares, which is at odds with empirical ndings. Introducing per period xed
costs to the baseline model generates the desired hump shape in participation and some
age e¤ects in portfolio shares, while still matching asset accumulation proles. We have
introduced a stylised pay-as-you-go pension scheme and shown how this acts as a moderator
for impatience; in the absence of pensions we would need a higher discount rate to keep
asset accumulation at the required level. More generous public pensions are seen to crowd
out self-insurance and lead to higher average conditional shares. Further, the size of xed
costs are found to be conditional on the level of taxes, providing some explanation for the
small empirical estimates.
The conditional portfolio shares remain implausibly high for all scenarios using low
risk aversion coe¢ cients. Disregarding the level of wealth, we can calibrate the model to
match the mean of both participation and conditional shares, with very reasonable age-
proles. Furthermore, if we are willing to accept slightly higher risk aversion with a very
high discount rate, it is possible to match all three statistics simultaneously.
It is important to stress that the literature has tended to neglect the matching of
wealth, and tends to match one statistic at a time (participation or shares, but not both)
under standard preference assumptions. This is the rst time the life-cycle model has
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achieved simultaneous matching of asset holdings and allocations, without resorting to
heterogeneous preferences or moving away from power utility functions. We are able to
achieve this through our innovation of augmenting the model to include per period xed
costs of stock market participation. We demonstrate that matching the observed partici-
pation and portfolio shares entails either allowing unrealistic levels of saving or accepting
uncomfortably high discount rates. This suggests to us that we have not captured the
full extent of background risk e¤ectively. Such extensions are left for future research, but
promising avenues include models that incorporate housing risk (Yao and Zhang, 2005) or
heterogeneity in expected returns (Alan and Ball, 2007).
Appendix A: Solution and simulation methods
The results presented in Section 4 use standard techniques to solve the model by back-
wards induction; starting from a terminal condition, in order to obtain the optimal policy
functions for each age, mapping the state variables into the controls. Using these functions
the model is simulated forward from t = 1 with an initial asset level of zero. The model
is simulated 10,000 times with ex-ante homogenous individuals who di¤er, ex-post, due to
di¤erent shock realisations; and the mean accumulated wealth and asset allocations are
computed.
Solving the Euler equations corresponds to the determination of a xed point within
an innite dimension state space, involving expectations over a non-linear marginal utility
function, where the unknown is a function over a continuum of points. Such complexity
means that the model cannot be solved analytically, which entails the implementation of
numerical techniques. The state space is discretised into a nite number of nodes and
interpolated using local approximation methods25.
The grids are dened so as to avoid the need for extrapolation outside the grid26. The
25Four hundred points are used for both the asset and savings grids. Linear splines are used for
interpolation.
26Extrapolation is much less reliable that interpolation, especially where the policy functions are non-
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concavity of the consumption function leads us to choose a non-uniform spacing of the
asset nodes. Extra points are positioned close to the lower bound, where the consumption
policy function displays a signicant amount of curvature. The nodes are more spread
out at high asset levels, at which point the functions become approximately linear. The
savings grid is also non-uniformly spaced as the portfolio share policy function is non-
linear. More points are positioned around the kink in the policy function, where the short
sales constraint ceases to bind, and fewer nodes at high levels of savings, where the policy
function becomes horizontal as it approaches the complete markets outcome. The solution
is found using NAG routines27, except for when these methods fail to converge, in which
case the non-linear system is solved using a bisection method28.
We perform all numerical integration using Gaussian quadrature to approximate the
distributions of labour income and the risky asset. The income shocks are discretised
into six values and the risky return uses three point quadrature. In the simulations, the
permanent shock to labour income is approximated as a continuous random variable. Each
time period is taken as a year of life. T was taken to be 58 years and K as 15 years, giving
a working life of 43 years (from age 22 to 65) and life coming to an end at 80.
A check on the accuracy of the solution method is undertaken by computing the realised
values of the Euler equations. When averaged across individuals, these results do not
deviate signicantly from their expected values.
Appendix B: Portfolio share policy functions
Figure 6 shows the portfolio share policy functions for three di¤erent ages, under parame-
ters outlined in Table I. At each age the policy function follows a highly nonlinear pattern.
At low levels of saving, the short sales constraint is binding and agents hold all of their
linear.
27Fortran code is available from the author on request.
28Bisection is an iterative procedure that computes the root of a one-dimensional function on a bounded
interval of the real line. It is one of the most robust procedures but it converges slowly, hence, it is only
used when the NAG routine fails.
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wealth in risky assets; represented by the horizontal section of the function. This derives
from non-tradable labour (or pension) income acting as a substitute for the risk free as-
set29. At low levels of saving the agent is highly endowed with this implicit risk free asset,
driving portfolio shares to 100%. As savings are increased, income becomes a relatively
less important fraction of wealth, giving low implicit risk free asset holdings and allowing
more diversication. At high levels of saving, income becomes a relatively insignicant
determinant of wealth and portfolio shares tend to the complete market solution30.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
As agents age, the policy functions in Figure 6 shift inwards, enabling more portfolio
diversication for a given level of saving. The young have a high present discounted value
of lifetime income, and this represents a large implicit holding of riskless assets, resulting in
high portfolio shares. As they grow older, the proportion of total lifetime wealth accounted
for by the present discount value of income declines, leading to lower implicit holdings of
riskless assets and a tilting of portfolios away from equities.
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Parameter Value
CRRA (L) 2
Riskless rate (r) 1.6
Mean risky return (req) 5.6
Variance of risky return 0.04
Variance of permanent shock (an2) 0.031
Variance of transitory shock (au2) 0.030
Proportional tax (b) 0.2
Table I:  Exogenous parameters
Simulated statistics Parameters
Scenario Median[A i,t]
Median[y i,t]
Mean participation Mean shares 1+N Fixed costs
US Data 1.84 0.57 0.54 - -
No FC tax = 0.2 1.84 0.95 0.98 1.086 -
Calibrated FC tax = 0.2 1.84 0.57 0.97 1.083 0.050
Keeping tax = 0.2 1.84 0.57 0.97 1.083 0.050
savings tax = 0.1 1.84 0.57 0.90 1.090 0.063
constant tax = 0.0 1.84 0.57 0.82 1.099 0.064
Keeping tax = 0.2 1.84 0.57 0.97 1.083 0.050
discount rate tax = 0.1 2.33 0.57 0.89 1.083 0.073
constant tax = 0.0 2.86 0.57 0.82 1.083 0.085
L = 4.0 tax = 0.2 5.76 0.57 0.54 1.083 0.065
L = 6.4 tax = 0.2 1.84 0.57 0.54 1.491 0.017
Table II:  Calibrated parameters and statistics
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Figure 1. Asset allocation profiles in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Graph (a) shows the
share of households holding risky assets.  Graph (b) shows the portfolio shares conditional on
stock market participation. The results for both graphs are taken from Bertaut and Starr-McCluer
(2002), using weighted data from 1998 SCF.  Risky assets include directly held stock; stock held
through mutual funds, retirement accounts, trusts and other managed assets; corporate, foreign
and mortgage-backed bonds; business equity; and investment real estate.
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Figure 2.  The effect of introducing per period fixed costs.  Graph (a) shows mean asset holdings
divided by mean earnings (averaged across individuals of working age).  Graph (b) shows stock
market participation by age.  Graph (c) shows conditional portfolio shares at each age.  The
discount rate is calibrated separately in each scenario such that median assets match the data.  For
the scenario with fixed costs (represented by the solid line in the graphs), the costs are calibrated
to match mean participation.
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Figure 3.  The effect of varying the generosity of public pension provision, keeping savings
constant.  Graph (a) shows mean asset holdings divided by mean earnings (averaged across
individuals of working age).  Graph (b) shows stock market participation by age.  Graph (c)
shows conditional portfolio shares at each age. The fixed costs are calibrated separately to match
mean participation. Discount rates are calibrated separately to match asset holdings.
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Figure 4.  The effect of varying the generosity of public pension provision, keeping the discount
rate constant (calibrated to the 20% tax rate).  Graph (a) shows mean asset holdings divided by
mean earnings (averaged across individuals of working age).  Graph (b) shows stock market
participation by age.  Graph (c) shows conditional portfolio shares at each age. The fixed costs
are calibrated separately to match mean participation.
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Figure 5.  The effect of varying the coefficient of risk aversion.  Graph (a) shows mean asset
holdings divided by mean earnings (averaged across individuals of working age).  Graph (b)
shows stock market participation by age.  Graph (c) shows conditional portfolio shares at each
age. The fixed costs are calibrated separately to match mean participation. In the scenarios
represented by the solid line and the dotted line, the discount rate is calibrated in each to match
asset holdings.  In the scenarios represented by the dashed and dotted lines the risk aversion is
calibrated to match mean portfolio shares.
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Figure. 6.  Portfolio share policy functions for three different ages, under baseline parameters.
